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Software-Defined Networking (SDN) has radically changed how we manage our
network, increasing flexibility, and enabling network programmability. Providing
security for tenants is one of the most significant issues in SDN. In this paper, our
goal is to introduce with an educational use case, four types of attack vectors asso-
ciated with malicious tenants that seriously challenge the SDN foundation. We also
provide suggestions to teach how to investigate the mitigation of these techniques
against the attacks. Our solution, to be tested in the classroom, introduce an approach
that utilizes several concepts, such as a topological graph to detect malicious tenants.
Unlike other methods to teach how to secure SDNs, our proposed approach teaches
how to detect and secure a system without requiring any changes to the underlying
protocols.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Software-Defined Networks (SDN) provide a new approach to manage networks. Controllers are the operating systems in SDN,
that make network control more programmable and dynamic. Being the OS of the network, an SDN controller provides users a
great tool to design and control the underlying network.1,2
Security is one of the critical aspects of networking in SDN. Modern architectures in SDN introduces new potential security
vulnerabilities in networking.3
By surveying the recent literature, we identified three main reasons that make SDN vulnerable to malicious tenants:4
(a) SDNs do not have any built-in security mechanism to prevent malicious switches or tenants from packet spoofing. (b)
Unlike a traditional network, SDN switches are considered to be dumb forwarding entities that forward packets based on the
installed rules on controllers. So many traditional attacks, including ARP poisoning and LLDP spoofing, could be performed
on vanilla SDN environments. (c) Software switches such as Open vSwitches are more attractive targets to even naive attackers
than hardware switches since it is harder to compromise hardware switches to modify routing rules.
Studying SDN security threats and countermeasures will help students understand why modern networking mechanisms use
the SDN paradigm, despite their vulnerabilities, and how such vulnerabilities may lead to other severe damages.
Besides, using SDN vulnerabilities as case studies, students can learn the principles of secure design of SDN applications.
However, designing practical case studies that are engaging and that meet course educational objectives requires significant
time investments. In this paper, we help towards this goal by presenting a few case studies to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of
the SDN and the effect of malicious tenants. The only requirement is Mininet as a lightweight virtualization/container-based
emulator. Malicious tenants are considered to generate packets. Meanwhile, various tools are used to perform attacks such as
DoS and MITM. Malicious Tenant floods the network with the spoofed traffic from the victim tenant. They can also launch
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packet injection and topology poisoning as well. Besides, they intercept traffic intended for another tenant. A malicious host
can continuously send forged ICMP scanning to form a DoS attack.
We believe the most similar work is by SR et al. in,5 where the authors employed three different approaches to expose SDN
to experimenters while achieving isolation and fair sharing goals. We are different as our goal is to evaluate SDN security by
showcasing several experiments. To do so, we present a few attacks that can be performed by a malicious tenant by exploit-
ing vulnerabilities in the OpenFlow protocol or the SDN platform within the network operating system. We demonstrate the
feasibility of these attacks in Mininet, a network emulation environment based on namespaces and the Linux traffic control
command tc. Finally, we introduce a new approach to detect malicious tenants based on their behavior on the network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of the concepts in SDN is discussed in Section 2. We then explore
our considered threat model followed by our experiments on Section 3. Section 4 introduces the proposed approach, and Section
5 concludes the work.
2 OPENFLOW AND LINK DISCOVERY PROCEDURE BACKGROUND
SDNs propose a promising architecture where the control and data planes are separated. In this section, we explain a few
underlying concepts and introduce some definitions.
OpenFlow, as an SDN protocol, offers developers control of the network software. It creates a standard, network-accessible
interface to control the data-plane of network equipment. Using OpenFlow, control-plane logic can be moved from individual
network devices to a centralized controller. Network protocol changes, traffic engineering requirements, as well as other updates,
can be accomplished by reconfiguring the controller instead of upgrading or replacing network hardware.
In order to handle the dynamic nature of tenants in SDN, many controllers often implement Host Tracking Services (HTS)
and Link Discovery Services (LDS). HTS keeps a tenant profile that includes a MAC address, an IP address, some location
information, and VLAN ID, which is updated dynamically. LDS dynamically discover topology and changes. In contrast with
a traditional network, the link service in an SDN network is special due to its logically centralized controller. This service is
implemented inside OpenFlow controllers and uses Open Flow Discovery Protocol (OFDP), which transfers LLDP (Link Layer
Discovery Protocol) packets through SDN switches. So LLDP packets are used to detect switch-to-switch links (Figure 1A).
The process is repeated for each port of all the switches in the network. The whole link discovery procedure is performed
periodically at fixed intervals.
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Figure 1B depicts the link discovery procedure in an SDN. First, theOpenFlow controller creates a single LLDP “Packet-Out”
packet for each port on switch A. The controller sends these messages to switch A with the payload of a controller-specific
LLDP packet. The payload of the LLDP packet contains DPID and the output port of switch A. When receiving the LLDP
packet, Switch A broadcasts it to all of its ports. When switch B receives the packet, it reports the incoming LLDP packet to the
controller with the ingress Port ID and DPID of Switch B via a “Packet-In” message. Because all switches have a pre-installed
rule in their flow table that forwards any LLDP packet received from any port, except for the controller port, to the controller
via an OpenFlow “Packet-In” message. Upon receiving the “Packet-In” message from Switch B, the OpenFlow controller can
detect a link from switch A to Switch B.
3 THREAT MODEL
Malicious tenants in SDN can be used to compromise the whole network. In this section, we introduce the possible threats of a
malicious tenant in SDN that we have considered.
3.1 Topology poisoning attack
First, we analyze a topology poisoning attack.6 This attack can be performed on an SDN controller to destroy its view of
the network by using detrimental “Packet-In” messages sent by the switches. These malicious “Packet-In” messages could
be generated by malicious tenants, which can send spoofed LLDP messages to affect connectivity across links between the
switches. Since there is no built-in mechanism in the SDN controller to ensure the integrity of LLDP packets, attackers can
perform topology poisoning efficiently.3 In the following, we discuss two scenarios that lead to fake topology attacks: (a)
Fabricated LLDP Injection and (b) LLDP Replay. These attacks affect the operation of network applications that are running in
the controller, such as packet routing, network virtualization, and mobility tracking.
3.1.1 Fabricated LLDP injection
In this scenario, an attacker generates intended fake LLDP packets into an OpenFlow network to announce a dummy internal
link between two SDN switches. Since the malicious tenant is connected to the switch, by monitoring the traffic from OpenFlow
switch, and decoding the LLDP packets, the attacker can extract packet fields. Then, the attacker can capture the specific format
of the LLDP packet, because each OpenFlow controller leverages specific syntax and TLVs for verification. Moreover, due to
the open-source nature of most controllers, the attacker can find out the format of the LLDP packet. As soon as the attacker
captures the LLDP packet and decodes it, he can modify the DPID and port number field of the LLDP packet, and launch the
Link Fabrication Attack. Figure 2A shows fake LLDP injection attack process. At the end of the attack, the controller view of
the network has changed: a new fake link is added to the links table.
3.1.2 LLDP replay attack
Instead of injecting manipulated LLDP packets, the attacker can replay a captured traffic through the network, in order to forge
target switch without any modification. The result of this attack is a fake topology view in the OpenFlow controller. A fake
internal link will be formed between two SDN switches (Figure 2B).
Typical non-SDN attacks can also be performed within an SDN-managed network. For example, malicious tenants and
switches can mount DoS attacks by flooding the network with traffic to random tenants to exhaust its resources, switches and
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F IGURE 2 Topology poisoning attack. A, Fabricated LLDP injection attack in SDN. B, LLDP replay attack in SDN
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SDN controller, thereby affecting forwarding in the data plane.Moreover, a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack can be performed
by sniffing traffic to discover IP addresses on the network, and then perform impersonification of the gateway or victim MAC
address by using ARP spoofing.
3.2 Use case experiment
To propose a method in enhancing the security of SDN, first, we deploy four attacks in Mininet that are performed by mali-
cious tenants to exploit SDN vulnerabilities. In each scenario, first, we build a custom topology with Mininet as a lightweight
virtualization/container-based emulator. Next, we set up a Floodlight controller and consider a malicious tenant that can gener-
ate packets and send them to the network. In each scenario, various tools can be used to perform the attack, such as Wireshark,
Scapy, Ettercap, Ping, and sFlow-RT. Each scenario is described in a separated section. We denote with h a Host/Tenant, and
we use S to denote a Switch.
3.2.1 Fabricated LLDP injection
In this scenario, we deploy fake LLDP attacks in an SDN network. First, we start Wireshark in h1 then capture the LLDP packets
that are sent by switch S1 and analysis the packet to retrieve LLDP packet components like TLVs and chassis ID. Second, we
create an LLDP packet and set the Src Mac, Chassis ID, and Port ID based on the switch S4 information with the Scapy library
and send the forged packet to h1.
When the attack occurred, a new link will appear between switch S1 and S4. Since those ports on the switches that were
connected to the tenants, reconnect to other ports in other switches, h1 and h2 lose their connection. Floodlight's log after the
attack shows an update in attachment between (Switch ID = 4, Port ID = 2) and (Switch ID = 1, Port ID = 1).
3.2.2 LLDP replay attack
To successfully launch an LLDP replay attack, the attacker first needs to find at least two tenants; a connection test can achieve
that. In the attack scenario, we capture LLDP traffic in h1, replay the captured traffic in another tenant (h2) and view the poisoned
topology in Floodlight.
3.2.3 MITM attack
In this scenario, we use Ettercap as a comprehensive tool for MITM attacks to launch a MITM in SDN that causes a malicious
tenant to sniff victim tenant traffic. First we open h1 terminal and start Ettercap on h1. From the Ettercap menu, we scan for
tenants. Add victim tenants h2 and h3 in tenants list as Target 1 and Target 2. We choose Arp poisoning from theMITM tab, then
check sniff remote connections and start sniffing. Then we launch the DVWA website on h3 and enter username and password
to log in. Ettercap outputs the username and password.
3.2.4 DoS attack
In this scenario, we use the Ping command to launch a DoS attack in SDN that causes a decrease in victim tenant performance.
SFlow-RT, an analytic software can monitor the traffic between tenants. We start a web server on host h1 and make a HTTP
request from host h2. Then we create a sFlow agent to capture the traffic. Finally, we launch the attack by generating a flood
directed to h1. The total transferred bytes are always less than 1 K during the experiment. However, the total transferred bytes
are over 300K when h3 runs “ping -f 10.0.0.1” command.
4 PROPOSED EDUCATIONAL APPROACH
Our proposed educational approach involves showing students how to prevent the attacks mentioned above with a methodology
based on three steps. First, students should monitor all the controller communication and identify relevant OpenFlow, ARP,
scanning, and other relevant packets. Due to the absence of encryption in the control plane, it is possible to capture control
and data plane traffic. In the second step, students should analyze this information separately based on their protocol types.
For example, OpenFlow packets can be used to build a topological network graph, or ARP packets can be used by Active ARP
inspection7 to detect ARP poisoning attacks. The topology graph approximates the actual network among tenants based on their
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TABLE 1 Summary of the related literature comparing response methods
References Method Modification TP DoS MITM
2 Sphinx: Build incremental flow graphs Yes ✓ — —
6 Monitor LLDP packets and topology update No ✓ — —
8 Considering LLTP switch-to-switch time Yes — — ✓
9 LLDP Packet Authentication Yes ✓ — —
10 Using stealthy probing-based verification No ✓ ✓ ✓
11 Add encrypted timestamps to LLDP Yes ✓ — —
12 Present secure and efficient OFDP Yes ✓ — —
communication flow. We analyze specific OpenFlow control messages to build this topology graphs. This graph is continuously
updated for changes. A simple program in the first step can passively capture OpenFlow messages, ARP packets, and other
relevant protocols. Then, a parser extracts high-level information related to the topology graph, ARP inspection, and scanning
attacks. In the last step, students can write code or use visual inspection to detect suspicious tenants. For example, to detect
malicious tenants based on the topology graph, students should look for a unidirectional edge in the graph. The tenant who is
attached to a switch with a unidirectional edge is suspicious. The output of our method is a Malicious Tenant List. A response
module can manage and quarantine malicious tenants in the entire network by changing the flow table strategy.13,14 Figure 3
depicts the steps and Figure 4 illustrates the components of the proposed approach. We investigate previous approaches used in
detecting or mitigating the mentioned threats. Table 1 compares different approaches in detecting malicious tenants.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we performed an analysis of vulnerabilities and threats in OpenFlow protocol and SDN infrastructure that could
lead to serious attacks. Besides, we introduced four types of attack vectors associated with malicious tenants that seriously
challenge the SDN foundation. Then the mitigation techniques against malicious tenants are investigated. Finally, we introduced
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an approach that utilized the topology graph, ARP inspection, andDoS detector to detectmalicious tenant. Despite othermethods
such as TopoGuard,6 our approach does not need any changes to underlying protocols.
We believe that with our simple approach, students could understand with simple hands-on experiments why SDN is
vulnerable, how such vulnerabilities lead to other severe damages, and why many security mechanisms are needed.
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